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The Deontic Cycling Problem 
Abstract: 
 In his recent article "Deontic Cycling and the Structure of Commonsense Morality," Tim 
Willenken argues that commonsense ethics allows for rational agents having both ranked reasons 
(A > B, B > C, and A > C) and cyclical reasons (A < B, B < C, and A > C).  His goal is to show 
that not all plausible views are variations of consequentialism, as consequentialism requires 
ranked reasons.  I argue instances of apparent deontic cycling in commonsense morality are the 
byproducts of incomplete characterizations of the cases in question. 
 
The Deontic Cycling Problem 
 In his recent article "Deontic Cycling and the Structure of Commonsense Morality," Tim 
Willenken contends that "A range of extremely plausible moral principles turn out to generate 
“deontic cycling”: sets of actions wherein I have stronger reason to do B than A, C than B, and A 
than C."
1
 (545)  He continues "Indeed, just about anything recognizable as commonsense 
morality generates deontic cycling."  For Willenken deontic cycling is not the result of a mistake 
by our moral faculties; rather it represents insight into moral truth.  The deontic cycling problem 
is that the existence of genuine deontic cycles would undermine the goal of normative ethics to 
offer moral prescriptions applicable to any given situation.  Here I argue that instances of that 
instances of apparent deontic cycling supported by commonsense morality are the byproducts of 
incomplete characterizations of the cases in question. 
 This paper is divided into two sections.  In the first, I argue deontic cycling is inconsistent 
with our commonsense moral beliefs.  In the second, I show that Willenken's primary example of 
apparent deontic cycling fails to be a genuine case.  The truth value of the theory Willenken calls 
"compatibilism" is outside the scope of this paper, as is whether the existence of genuine deontic 
cycling would be sufficient to prove "compatibilism" false. 
I. 
 The goal of Willenken's paper is to demonstrate the falsity of a position he (oddly) calls 
"compatibilism", the theory that consequentialism can be rendered consistent with commonsense 
morality; that commonsense moral beliefs are best understood in consequentialist terms.  For 
example, consequentialists would contend that the wrongness of lying is best understood in terms 
of its unfavorable consequences.  Consequentialist views require that agents be able to rank 
alternatives by the strength of one's reasons to do them; however Willenken argues that instances 
of deontic cycling show that moral reasons cannot be ranked. 
 For the consequentialist, for any three morally inequivalent options, if B is morally 
preferable to A, and C is morally preferable to B, then C is morally preferable to A.  (C > B > A) 
However, in an instance of deontic cycling, B might be morally preferable to A, C morally 
preferable to B, but A morally preferable to C! (C > B, B >A, A > C) 
 Willenken's approach runs into two substantial problems.  First, on Willenken's 
description of compatibilism, the compatibilist has a rather open interpretation of 
consequentialism.  Such a compatibilist would have no difficulty explaining deontic cycling in 
terms of situationally preferable consequences.  For example, a compatibilist might contend that 
in an AB-situation, B has relatively preferable consequences to A, in a BC-situation, C has 
relatively preferable consequences to B, and in an AC-situation, A has relatively preferable 
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consequences to B.  The existence or nonexistence of deontic cycling makes no difference to 
such consequentialists. 
 Second, even if deontic-cycling were evidence of the falsity of such compatibilist 
theories, the medicine is worse than the disease.  A satisfactory normative ethical theory will be 
capable of offering a moral prescription in any given situation.  The existence of a genuine 
deontic cycle would mean that in some situations (ABC-situations) there are no moral answers. 
Willenken argues that deontic cycling is the result of our commonsense moral beliefs; however 
for the remainder of this section I argue that genuine deontic cycling is radically at odds with our 
commonsense moral beliefs. 
 In an effort to demonstrate how deontic cycling is a result of our commonsense moral 
beliefs, Willenken constructs what he calls a "toy view" containing only two rules:  (1) when 
faced with a choice between saving two boys, save the older boy, and (2) when faced with a 
choice between saving a boy and a girl, save the healthier of child.  (549) When forced to choose 
between saving (u) saving a healthy young boy or (v) saving an unhealthy older boy, (1) requires 
him to save the older boy.  When forced to choose between (v) saving a very unhealthy older 
boy, or (w) saving a moderately healthy girl, (2) forces him to save the girl.  When forced to 
choose between (u) saving a very healthy younger boy, or (w) saving a moderately healthy girl, 
(2) requires he save the younger boy.   Willenken asks us to choose between (u), (v), or (w).  
Here the toy view generates a deontic cycle, and thus there is no answer.  A deontic cycle is 
genuine only if the moral beliefs that generate it are true, but Willenken is under no illusions that 
the rules of the toy view are true. 
 If we understand ethics as the branch of philosophy concerned with determining what the 
right thing to do is in any given situation; the possibility of UVW-situations demonstrate how at 
odds the idea of deontic cycling is with our commonsense moral beliefs.  Willenken's toy view 
fails as a moral theory.  Not only is it inherently arbitrary, but insofar as it fails to offer a 
prescription for how to deal with UVW-situations, it is incomplete.  The toy view illustrates that 
any theory that generates a deontic cycle fails to offer a prescription for any given situation, and 
is thus fails to be a satisfactory normative theory.   If a set of prima facie plausible, 
commonsense moral beliefs would generate a deontic cycle, at least one of these beliefs must be 
false, misinterpreted, or incomplete. 
 Willenken's acceptance of the possibility of genuine deontic cycling raises another 
problem; it requires an overly burdensome ontology.  One means to judge normative ethical 
theories is in terms of ontological simplicity; attractive normative ethical theories rely upon one 
overarching moral principle applicable to any situation.  However, a prerequisite for genuine 
deontic cycling is the existence of multiple, independent moral principles that can lead to deontic 
cycles. 
 Suppose that you believe that there are genuine instances of deontic cycling; what must 
you give up to hold this belief?  First, you must give up the idea that ethics is complete, that 
every action is either morally acceptable or unacceptable; in deontic cycles there simply is no 
morally acceptable or unacceptable solution.  Second, you must give up the notion of a single 
normative principle, and instead adopt a bloated ontology that allows for the existence of any 
number of separate, unrelated and irreducible normative principles.   
 What does the pro-deontic cycling theorist get out of such a bargain?  In a sense, the 
bloated ontology and incomplete nature of normative ethics required for the possibility of 
genuine deontic cycling is its own reward; this is to say that Willenken's view is prima facie 
consistent with whatever commonsense moral beliefs individuals might actually hold, regardless 
  
of whether these beliefs lead to deontic cycles or contradictions.  If one is committed to a cache 
of beliefs that generate deontic cycling quagmires, one can rest assured that their beliefs might be 
true!  But this seems like it would be little comfort to those who might find themselves wading 
into such moral quagmires; in fact, it seems more like a curse than a blessing.  If genuine deontic 
cycling is incoherent, when one enters a situation that appears to generate a deontic cycle, she 
knows that one or more of her moral beliefs is false, and she can engage in a reflective 
equilibrium with the goal of purging herself of the false belief or beliefs.  However, if genuine 
deontic cycling were coherent and possible, one might very well find oneself in a situation where 
there is no right thing to do.  Furthermore, if it is possible that some of our moral beliefs are 
false, there would be no way of determining whether a situation is a genuine instance of deontic 
cycling, or a faux instance. 
 Willenken seems to embrace the existence of deontic cycling solely because he believes 
no possible axiology will make consequentialism consistent with a view that includes genuine 
instances of deontic cycling, and because of this "compatibilism" is false.  The price for this 
conclusion, though, appears to be a hobbling of ethics that flies in the face of the very 
commonsense moral beliefs that he uses to support the existence of deontic cycling. 
II. 
 Willenken's primary example of deontic cycling comes from a series of trolley cases, 
where trolley cases are notorious for generating prima facie inconsistent sets of moral intuitions.
2
  
The apparently inconsistent moral intuitions generated by these cases, he contends, are actually 
the result of deontic cycling.  Willenken generates his apparent deontic cycle with the following 
three cases: 
Case 1: 
 There are two empty runaway trolleys, and you have the ability to stop one of these 
trolleys, but not the other.  (Perhaps the switches you need to pull to stop both trains are too far 
apart to sprint to both in time.)  The first trolley is barreling down a track that has five innocent 
people tied to it, the second is barreling down a track with two innocent people tied to it.  You 
have two choices: 
(x) Let five people die. 
(y) Let two people die. 
 According to Willenken, commonsense morality dictates that (y) is preferable to (x), and 
that you ought to choose (y). 
Case 2: 
 There is a single empty runaway trolley about to kill two people tied to a track.  There is 
one way to stop the trolley before it kills both of these people:  You can reposition one of these 
two people earlier on the track.  If you do so, that person will die, but the other of the two will 
live.  You have two choices: 
(y) Let two people die. 
(z) Kill one person. 
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 Examples of trolley cases can be found in Philippa Foot, "The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double 
Effect," Oxford Review, Number 5, 1967: 5-15; Judith Jarvis Thomson, "Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley 
Problem," The Monist, 1976: 204-217; Judith Jarvis Thomson, "The Trolley Problem," Yale Law Journal, 1985: 
1395-1415; Peter Unger, Living High and Letting Die, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996; Francis Myrna 
Kamm, "Harming Some to Save Others," Philosophical Studies 1989: 227-260 
 
  
 Again, Willenken contends commonsense ethics contends (z) is preferable to (y), and that 
you ought to choose (z). 
Case 3: 
 There is a single empty trolley traveling down a track with five people tied to it.  The 
trolley is about to go under a bridge, then soon after it will hit the five people.  There is only one 
way to stop the trolley before it kills all five people - you can push a relatively large person off of 
the bridge, and this person will fall to her death and derail the trolley.  You have two choices: 
(x) Let five people die. 
(z) Kill one person. 
 Willenken contends that commonsense ethics dictates (x) is preferable to (z).  He 
contends that commonsense ethics has generated a deontic cycle: (y) > (x), (z) > (y), and (x) > 
(z).  For this to be a genuine deontic cycle, were there a case where you could choose from (x), 
(y), and (z), our commonsense moral beliefs would fail to be prescriptive.  Consider the 
following case: 
Case 4: 
 There is a single trolley barreling down tracks with five people tied to them.  A mad 
villain, obsessed with proving the existence of deontic cycles, has tied you to a chair in the 
trolley control room.  The villain explains that if you press button (x), all five people on the 
tracks will die, that if you press button (y), a switch will be turned, and the trolley will run over 
the first two people, but avoid the last three people.  Finally, if you press button (z), a different 
switch will be turned, which will divert the trolley from its course - however in doing so, it will 
rip the first of the give people in half, killing her before the trolley has a chance to.  You, thus, 
are confronted with the following choice: 
(x) Let five people die. 
(y) Let two people die. 
(z) Kill one person. 
 It strikes me that in this situation our commonsense moral beliefs dictate that we ought to 
choose (z).  But if there is a clear, commonsense moral choice in between (x), (y), and (z), then 
our commonsense moral beliefs are not generating a deontic cycle.  How do we explain this? 
 Willenken's deontic cycle is created by equivocation between the various options listed in 
the cases, between (x
1
) and (x
3
); (y
1
) and (y
2
); and (z
2
) and (z
3
).  The difference between these 
options is most apparent in the case of the last set.  In case 2, (z
2
) involves the killing of a person 
who would have died either way.  James Rachels famously argues that, all else being equal, 
killing and letting die are morally equivalent, so in case 2 when you choose (z
2
) you neither harm 
nor benefit that person in any substantial way (at worst, you shave a few moments off of his life 
to save another person).
3
  In case 3, (z
3
) involves the killing of an innocent person who would not 
have died unless you pushed him onto the tracks.
4
  Even if you hold there is a morally relevant 
difference between killing and letting die, the killing of the person in case 2 is substantially 
morally different than the killing of the person in case 3, if for no other reason than the fact that 
you have no control over whether that person dies in case 2, but have total control over whether 
the person dies in case 3.  Willenken's deontic cycle is an illusion by equivocation - he treats (z
2
) 
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 See James Rachels, “Active and Passive Euthanasia,” The New England Journal of Medicine, Vol. 292, 1975: 78-
80; “Killing and Starving to Death,” Philosophy, Vol. 54, No. 208, 1979: 159-171. 
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 Oddly, case 3 in and of itself is a fairly effective argument against "compatibilism" and consequentialism, as it is 
an instance where in a choice between one life and five lives, our commonsense moral beliefs appear to show that 
one life is more valuable. 
  
and (z
3
) as morally equivalent when they are not.  Even if each of the other options were morally 
equivalent between cases, all he has shown is that (z
3
) > (y) > (x) > (z
2
).  But (x
1
) and (x
3
) are 
different, where (x
1
) is the option to save two people and let five other people die, while (x
3
) is 
the option to let five people die rather than kill an innocent person.  In any charitable reading (x
1
) 
and (x
3
), (y
1
) and (y
2
), and (z
2
) and (z
3
) are not morally equivalent to their counterpart, thus these 
three cases do not demonstrate even an apparent deontic cycle. 
 Further complication the issue, Willenken's analysis of the options in each case focus 
exclusively on the expected outcomes, rather than the agent's intent.  However, two distinct 
actions can have the same expected outcome while being morally inequivalent.  Consider the 
following two cases: 
Hostage Case 1: 
 John, a police officer, is called to the scene where a violent escaped criminal is holding a 
hostage.  John believes that the hostage's life is in danger, and that the criminal might escape to 
threaten other people, and that the best way to free the hostage is to shoot and kill the criminal.  
John shoots the criminal, intending to kill the criminal as a means to free the hostage.  He 
succeeds, the criminal is killed by his shot, and the hostage is freed. 
Hostage Case 2: 
 Joan, a police officer, is called to the scene where a violent escaped criminal is holding a 
hostage.  Joan believes that the hostage's life is in danger, and that the criminal might escape to 
threaten other people, and that the best way to free the hostage is to shoot and kill the criminal.   
Joan also likes killing people.  Joan shoots the criminal, taking this opportunity to satisfy her 
bloodlust in a way that will look like responsible police work.  She succeeds, the criminal is 
killed by her shot, and the hostage is freed. 
 In these cases John and Joan both act to kill the criminal, but John is morally 
praiseworthy for his action, while Joan is not.  Of course we are not often privy to the inherently 
private mental states of others, so when we witness a police officer shooting a hostage in a case 
like this, we can only judge them with incomplete information.  The difference between John and 
Joan is the moral intention with which they act.  It strikes me that a proper analysis of 
Willenken's cases requires a full account of the intentions with which the agents act.  For 
example, in case (1), the choice isn't between (x
1
) - let five people die - and (y
1
) - let two people 
die -, it's a choice between (w
1
) let all seven people die, (x
1a
) act to save the two people first, then 
try to save the five people, (y
1a
) act to save the five people first, then try to save the two people, 
(x
1b
) act to save the two people first so as to appear virtuous, and pretend to reach the last five, 
but purposely fail so you get to enjoy watching five people die, so forth and so on.  Willenken 
treats the options in case 1 as if the intentions of the agent in question are morally irrelevant, and 
the outcome is certain; but neither is the case.   
 Were one faced with the decision in case 1, it strikes me that the right choice is (y
1a
) - 
you try your best to save both sets of people, starting with the larger set.  It may be impossible to 
save both sets, but to not try to save both sets is, I think, uncontroversially morally abhorrent.  
Suppose that you were to watch someone race towards the first track, and throw the level as hard 
as they could so as to save the five people imperiled by the first trolley, then sit back leisurely as 
the second trolley runs over two people.  I imagine we'd judge such a person morally despicable 
- if there is even the slightest chance one could save both sets, commonsense morality dictates 
that  you should try. 
Conclusion: 
  
 The apparent instance of deontic cycling between cases 1-3 is generated by equivocation 
between unlike expected outcomes.  Case 3 represents a genuine moral dilemma - we are 
committed to the proposition that killing and letting die, all else being equal, are morally 
equivalent, but that when forced with the choice between killing an innocent man and letting five 
innocent people die, our commonsense moral intuition seems to commit us to choosing the latter. 
This case draws our attention to a genuine inconsistency in our commonsense moral beliefs, but  
Willenken denies this, instead contending that our commonsense moral beliefs are consistent, but 
incomplete; cobbled together from disparate irreducible moral principle that each capture a 
different moral truth.  This move renders ethics incomplete and bloats our ontological 
commitments with no discernible benefit.  This is not a move worth making. 
